Schopenhauer's Account of Character.

Schopenhauer’s account of character is consistent with his ontological monism and his epistemological dualism. The subject itself is nothing but a certain objectification of the will. If we try and examine the subject in terms of its character we are thereby given over to the empirical character as such; the character, which is manifest in space and time and subject to the principle of sufficient reason. Along with the dualism of the world, as both will and representation, we find a similar distinction in the makeup of the subject. The problem, which only becomes apparent if one takes a certain position in view of it, is that the subject has absolutely no access to the intelligible character as such. The further problem is that the intelligible character is given in advance and the existing subject neither has access, nor any influence over its content. The intelligible character, which is nothing but the objectification of the will at a specific grade, contains within it the entirety of the singular will as such. The questions which seem to suggest themselves in light of the Schopenhauerian account are, firstly, what are we too make of the notion of noumenal freedom if that freedom is determined in advance? Secondly, in what way can the subject be individuated?
Let us begin with intelligible, or intellectual character, which is closest to the will as it is in itself. The intelligible character is nothing but an objectification of the will at a certain grade. As such, the intelligible character is invisible, that is to say it does not appear as a phenomenon, but rather, finds its phenomenon in the empirical character of the existing subject. It is therefore the case that, insofar as the subject is concerned, his intelligible character remains indeterminate, with each determination being merely the determination of the empirical character in relation to some specific here and now. Schopenhauer maintains, along with Kant before him that there exists absolute freedom in the noumenal realm:
As the will itself is not phenomenon, not representation or object, but thing-in-itself, it is also not subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason, the form of all object. Thus it is not determined as a consequent by a reason or ground, and so it knows no necessity, in other words, the denial of the relation of consequent to its ground according to the principle of sufficient reason.[1]
The intelligible character, therefore, is groundless, an act of will outside of time and is hence unchangeable and invisible.[2]
The Empirical character is nothing but the phenomenal appearance of the intelligible character. As such, the empirical character is the determination of the phenomena of the intellectual character. All the same, the intellectual character remains invisible, while the empirical character unfolds in the course of the action of the individual. Every action of the individual is an act of will, or the manifestation of the intellectual character as empirical character. Even the body itself is the manifestation of an act of will.
Therefore, this body itself must be phenomenon of there will, must be related to my will as a whole, that is to say, to my intelligible character, the phenomena of which in time is my empirical character, in the same way as the particular action of the body is to the particular act of the will.[3]
The empirical character, however, unfolds in accordance with motives which appear as the cause of the particular action as such. It follows from this that the empirical character is determined wholly in advance from an act of will outside of time, which manifests itself temporally in the form of the unfolding of the empirical character. It might be argued, therefore, that clues as to the way of the will in itself might reside somewhere in the determinate unfolding of the empirical character, that is to say, in the particular action of the subject, or in the volitional movements of the body itself as the seat of individuality.
We have examined the intellectual character as the pre-phenomenal objectification of the will as such, and the empirical character as the phenomenal appearance of the intellectual character. It is now possible to turn toward an examination of the acquired character in an attempt to point to the relevance of character in moralistic terms. Acquired character seems to denote a kind of experiential impact; the coming to grips with the unfolding of our intellectual character by way of the empirical character. Perhaps, as Schopenhauer puts it: “Ultimately we become acquainted with ourselves as quite different from what a priori we considered ourselves to be; and then we are often alarmed at ourselves.”[4] It is therefore the case that we must presuppose our character as such and such in order to act in the world. Until we truly gain an understanding of ourselves, through encountering the phenomena of the unchangeable empirical character, we cannot truly be said to possess a character. Rather until the point wherein we acquire a character, our empirical character simply unfolds in natural patterns,[5] which are nothing but the blind striving of the will itself through intellectual consciousness. The Acquired character, therefore, is a knowledge of our empirical character, which is given through its phenomena, which allows us to understand our strengths and weaknesses in given situations so that we may act in accordance with conscious rules we might make.[6]

What therefore is the moral relevance of Schopenhauer’s account of character? While it certainly appears to be true that in terms of the intellectual character, which is invisible and outside of time, and the empirical character which is within time and pre-determined, there is little the individual can accomplish which would be of moral relevance. When we import the theory of acquired character into the mix, we find that we are prevented with the possibility of a choice. Once we are properly acquainted with the way in which our empirical unfolded we are in a position to either affirm or deny the course upon which we have already embarked. That is to say that we might be in a position, once we have understood the patterns of our empirical character, to moderate the excesses of our character and understands it limitations in the interest of doing good or not doing bad. Ultimately, however, the empirical character itself remains and is unalterable, it would therefore require a constant vigilance to either affirm, or deny it.
[1] Arthur Schopenhauer. The World As Will and Representation, trans E.F.J. Payne. New York: Dover Publications, 1966. pp. 287.
[2] Ibid., pp. 289.
[3] Ibid., pp. 107.

[4] Ibid., 296.
[5] Ibid., pp. 303.
[6] Ibid., pp. 305.