If we are attentive to the critique of Kant that takes place throughout Schopenhauer’s work, it seems to me that his theory of ‘occasional causation’ arises from a certain objection he has to the characterization of the Kantian ‘thing-in-itself.’ There is a kind of ambiguity at play in the work of Kant; an ambiguity, which has lead to vast perversions and departures from the true relevance of the Copernican turn accomplished by Kant.[1] A certain confusion is being addressed, as such, Schopenhauer’s theory can be characterized as the attempt to clarify, omit, or perhaps negate the apparent effects of this confusion.[2] Schopenhauer is a strong epistemological dualist, that is to say, he posits that the world and reality in fact have two ways of being, as will and as representation, both are always already at work in a kind of simultaneity. The following examination will attempt to explain Schopenhauer’s theory of ‘occasional causation’ in relation to his larger philosophical project. What follows will argue that the theory of ‘occasional causation’ conceptualizes the non-causal movement between the will, as ‘thing-in-itself,’ and representation, as the phenomenal appearance of the will. This non-causal movement allows Schopenhauer to claim that the will manifests itself, as phenomena, representationally, according to the principle of sufficient reason. We can see therefore, provided we are attentive to its subtlety, how the will, as thing-in-itself, is not the cause of its phenomena, but rather these phenomena are the occasion within which the will manifests itself outwardly.
Let us take our departure from the primary distinction which animates Schopenhauer’s entire project. The world has two fundamental ways of being, that is the world is ‘as will’ and ‘as representation.’ As such, the proper way of proceeding would be to engage with these two distinct ways of the world.
The will as thing-in-itself is quite different from its phenomenon, and is entirely free from all the forms of the phenomenon into which it first passes when it appears, and which therefore concern only its objectivity, and are foreign to the will itself.[3]
The way of the world ‘as will,’ if we are attentive to Schopenhauer’s formulation, is different from its phenomena, different from its objectification. The will, as such, is singular, however, in its appearance, according to the principle of sufficient reason, manifests as a plurality; the will, however, as it is in itself, contains no such plurality. Rather the will is simply an aimless, blind unfolding, a force, which manifests itself through recourse to pockets of matter, which allow its appearance to be determined according to a particular here and now.[4] Force, is nothing but a certain grade of the will’s objectification, there are therefore, types of force according to the different gradations of objectification.[5] In each case the determination of the force is only the determination of the phenomena and not of the force itself, which is in fact timeless, groundless and outside of the realm of causality.[6] The will, therefore, remains whole, a singular will, however, its appearances, or representations take place as matter, in time and space, according to the principle of sufficient reason. It is possible to say, therefore, that the entirety, the whole of the singular will is present in any one of its particular appearances. The noumenal realm, therefore, is a mirror for the phenomenal realm, however, it remains whole and in itself simultaneously alongside its appearances.
If we turn therefore, to Schopenhauer’s account of causality we find that there is absolutely no inconsistency involved in his theory of ‘occasional causation.’ Rather, Schopenhauer has added an entirely different realm; one existing alongside the realm of appearances.
Now in just the same way, he who has recognized the form of the principle of sufficient reason which governs the content of those forms (of time and space), their perceptibility, i.e. matter., matter, and hence the law of causality, has thereby recognized the entire essence and nature of matter as such; for matter is absolutely nothing but causality, as anyone sees immediately the moment he reflects upon it.[7]
If we are attentive to Schopenhauer’s argument we see that matter necessarily presupposes a relation between space and time, hence, the essence of matter is causality. Schopenhauer’s account of causality therefore, takes place in the realm of appearance, within the world ‘as representation’ as the realm of variation and change in time according to the principle of sufficient reason. The subjective correlate of causality in the subject is the understanding, as such: “…all causality, hence all matter, and consequently the whole of reality, is only for the understanding, through the understanding, in the understanding.”[8] Our access to the will, as such, comes from our access to the phenomena of the will from within the veil of Maya; from representations, which are nothing more than the occasion upon which the singular, indivisible, will in itself manifests itself as pluralistic phenomenon. No single phenomenon can represent the inner nature of the will in itself as such, but rather the will in its wholeness is contained in every particular representation.
‘Occasional causation’ is the outward manifestation of the singular will, through the appearance of its phenomena for the understanding. What we have, therefore, is the presence of the completed totalized in itself will in every representation, which is only a part. Or perhaps, as Schopenhauer puts it:
…every natural cause is only an occasional cause. It gives only the opportunity the occasion, for the phenomenon of that one and indivisible will which is the in itself of all things, and whose graduated objectification is the whole visible world.[9]
Schopenhauer’s dualism therefore manifests itself throughout his discourse, ultimately leading to the inescapable conclusion that as subjects we are determined throughout by the will in itself. Take for instance the difference between the intellectual and empirical character. If our intellectual character is always already determined in advance, that is to say, if it is merely a phenomenon of the singular will; then our character is beyond our influence. It is true that we cannot change our intellectual character as it is outside the realm of appearances, however, we can, through our motives, determine the appearance of our character in its phenomena in the here and now. That is to say that while we cannot affect the inner nature of our character, we can, as it were, influence its outer manifestation in the world as our empirical character.
Schopenhauer’s theory is consistent, albeit somewhat fatalistic. ‘Occasional causation’ is not really causation at all, but rather conceptualizes a space, which is precisely a non-causal space. The will does not act upon, nor does it cause its phenomena, but rather as a whole unto itself, come to light through the graded objectifications, through the unfolding of phenomena in the world. Schopenhauer wants us to avoid thinking of the will as an object, because objects are only for subjects, and therefore fall within the domain of the principle of sufficient reason. This is precisely the confusion Schopenhauer wants to address in Kant’s thing-in-itself, at times the unreachable beyond, yet somehow at the same time, a kind of object.
[1] I think, in Schopenhauer’s view, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel’s projects arise out of this ambiguity.
[2] In order to avoid confusion of our own the confusion in this case is the tendency to regard the thing-in-itself as some kind of temporal object, which in turn causes phenomenal experience (World I 434-435).
[3] Arthur Schopenhauer. The World As Will and Representation, trans E.F.J. Payne. New York: Dover Publications, 1966. pp. 112.
[4] Schopenhauer. The World As Will and Representation. pp 10-11.
[5] Schopenhauer outlines various gradations of force as the objectification of the will, stimulus being a case in plant life, motives being a cause in human and animal life (World I 117).
[6] Ibid., pp. 131.
[7] Ibid., pp 8.
[8] Ibid., pp. 11.
[9] Ibid., pp 138.
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