Thursday, November 20, 2008

Heidegger: The 'How' of Dasein's Everydayness.

Dasein is that entity for which being is an issue; further it is that entity which, in every case, is mine specifically. How, therefore, is it possible for Dasein to be mine specifically and yet not be itself authentically in everydayness? The ‘how,’ with which the current examination will concern itself, is the manner in which Dasein exists in everydayness. Heidegger terms his endeavour an “existential analytic” of Dasein. Heidegger, therefore, concerns himself with the question of “how’ Dasein exists the ‘I,’ as given, such that it may not exist the ‘I’ as authentically itself. Hidden within the question of ‘how,’ therefore, resides the question of ‘who’ Dasein ‘is’ in everydayness; furthermore, this ‘who’ may be hidden from Dasein in its everydayness. The “I,” as given, which is a kind of reflexive awareness on the part of Dasein, masks what is a fundamental characteristic of Dasein’s existence; namely its existence in the “world.” In everydayness the “I” of Dasein is not existed as itself properly, but rather, it is existed as the they-self to which, as throwness, it has been given over. As such, Dasein always encounters itself as already submitted to the “world” into which it has been thrown As being-with-others in the world, Dasein is encountered in its throwness as a falling away from its authentic self and into the they-self of everydayness. Therefore, it becomes proper to pose a question of ‘how’ Dasein exists, or lives its ‘I’ such that this ‘I’ is lived by Others.
Dasein, as ‘being there,’ is encountered in its ‘there; the ‘there’ imparts with a notion of spatiality as a location wherein Dasein comes to encounter itself. Dasein, as such, has a two-fold structure, an ‘is’ as existence, or being, and a ‘there’ as a location. It is impossible, therefore, to have Dasein without also having a “world.” Therefore, hidden within the “I” proclamation of Dasein, there necessarily lurks “world.” Thus, while Dasein is necessarily my specificity; it is also my being-in-the-world; as being-in-the-world, my Dasein is necessarily being-with the Dasein of Others.
Understanding is derived from a totality of involvements; Dasein is such that it is always being-with in a ‘world’ as the totality of possible involvements. Dasein, as being-in-the-world, as existing spatially, is that entity which, in concernful situatedness, circumspectively de-severs.[1] Therefore, although Dasein proclaims the ‘I’ as a reflexive representation of itself, existentially the ‘I’ remains furthest from Dasein in everydayness. Rather, what becomes most proximate is the phenomenon of ‘world,’ as the totality of involvements; as the wherein of Dasein’s understanding; as that in-terms-of-which the fore-structure[2] of understanding is derived and the into which the understanding is projected. Dasein encounters itself proximally as already existing, as being there amongst entities, as already involved with the world of ‘significance[3], in doing what Dasein does. Hence, Dasein encounters itself in those entities with which it is concerned environmentally. Others are not encountered as something ready-to-hand, or as a present-at-hand[4] for contemplation; rather Others are encountered environmentally, in terms of the world of Dasein’s concern. The environment, however, is encountered in everydayness as ready-to-hand; as such, in concern Dasein encounters the products of others circumspectively. Thus it becomes apparent the being alongside the Dasein of Others has the character of togetherness as being one Dasein amongst many in concernful situatedness, within an environment. The relationship Dasein has with the Dasein of Others is, as Heidegger states it:
“The relationship-of-being which one has towards Others would then become a Projection of one’s own Being-towards-oneself ‘into something else.’ The Other would be a duplicate of the Self.”[5]
Dasein encounters itself, in its ‘there,’ as thrown into the ‘world,’ with which it is concerned, as falling away from itself, in everydayness, and into the generality of ‘the they.’ As the they-self, Dasein is not itself authentically; rather it is at once everyone and no one.
In everydayness Dasein has, as it were, been colonized, or dominated, by Others. In everydayness, absorbed in the ‘world,’ Dasein’s being-with is subject to Others. In everydayness being-with is absorbed in the being of Others; therefore, in everydayness, Dasein lives as everyone lives, and as no one in particular lives. Dasein, always understands itself in terms of its potentiality, in the possibilities of its being in the world. In everydayness, Dasein’s possibilities have been determined by the they-self and not by itself properly. As the they-self Dasein is ‘disburdened’ from itself as not being itself authentically, as falling away from it own authentic self. In everydayness, the ready-to-hand environment with which Dasein is concerned, as being-with, is a being-among-one-another. The being of the they-self, which Dasein is most proximally in everydayness, concerns itself with averageness. Averageness, as such, seems to bridge the ‘distantiality,’[6] as a manner of eliminating differences between individual Dasein. Dasein is such that it always remains open to the possibility of becoming itself, of finding itself as authentically itself. However, in everydayness, it is not the authentic self of Dasein that interprets the world, rather it is the They-self which interprets for Dasein. In everydayness, Dasein is for-the-sake-of Others and ‘significance’ is determined by ‘the-they.’
It has been established ‘how’ Dasein comes to be lived by others in everydayness; how Dasein comes to do what One does, rather than what might be done by Dasein authentically. The ‘who’ of Dasein in everydayness is the nobody of the ‘they.’ Which in turn is ‘how’ Dasein interprets itself pre-ontolologically and in everydayness. Dasein encounters itself in its throwness into the ‘world’ as a being-with; in turn this being-with, in everydayness, is falling away from the self which Dasein always has as a possibility of itself. The-they, therefore, determines Dasein in advance, thus the task Dasein has, is another ‘how.’ ‘How’ can Dasein exist such that it can find itself and exist itself authentically?


[1] De-severing; as a binging close of that which is at a distance, or as eliminating distance, such that that which is most proximate distantially might be furthest away from Dasein circumspectively.
[2] Martin Heidegger. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York : Harper & Row, 1962. p 190-194.
[3] Significance is the structural totality of world, as that which can be signified.
[4] A total clarification of what is meant by the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand is beyond the scope of the current examination. It seems necessary, however, to at least give a brief illumination of what is meant by this distinction. The-Ready-to-hand withdraws in circumspection in Dasein’s concernful absorption with it. The Ready-to-hand is not something for contemplation; rather, it becomes transparent in its use. The Present-at-hand, is that which is open to contemplation. The Ready-to-hand is possible, as that which was once Present-at-hand. Dasein encounters these entities, not of the character of Dasein, in its concern with them.
[5] Heidegger. Being and Time. p 162.
[6] Averageness seems to enact a kind of ‘de-severing’ between my Dasein and the Dasein of Others.

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