Temporality is the name of that which holds the movement of life together, while simultaneously making of life a series of moments, of flowing presents and past retentions. The movement of temporality takes on central importance in the Phenomenology of Perception because it is our movement as existing subjects, condemned to meaning, or as it were, condemned to unfold temporally. In apprehension, what is apprehended is only apprehended in retrospection as part of the temporal flux, and that this reflection itself is in turn part of the flux. Time is a self-relation wherein the self seems to be reduced to a moment of non-being, or absence, taking place in relative fields of presence. We are, as it were, the absence, the kernel of non-being, which relates the passive and active poles, the space from which comes the upsurge of time. We live, as it were, in the midst of a temporal field, in a world, we do not constitute but take up and reckon with it in order to express, say, and act. We can’t not unfold in this manner, as our being is not simply a transparent given, but rather a temporal unfolding in a temporal field. Neither is time simply an eternal something which is complete alongside our being. Beneath the temporality of our acts, expressions, gestures, lies an intentionality which pushes them all along, an operant intentionality which comes before all of them and which they cannot do without. There is a time that we are existingly as living, or unfolding in the world, and there is a temporality, which serves as the background, from which our existence derives its significance. In the present, the living present, we have the moment wherein our being and our consciousness of being intersect and overlap in a spontaneous acquisition, which upon reflection, is appropriated in a historical field which I carry along as so many retentions of past acquisitions. Once acquired these acquisitions become part of the retentions which I protend into the horizon of the future; even further, they become part of the spontaneous self which apprehends in the moment of the living present. Time is the subject, the relation, the dialectic between being and having, the acquired and the possible.
It is perhaps here in the temporality chapter that the true significance of the Phenomenology of Perception is brought to the foreground. We live in fields of fields, of which temporality is simply the most basic, or perhaps the most originary. We historically have had the tendency to privilege the activities of thetic intentionality and disregard the level of ‘mere’ existence which lives beneath it. This example, of what Merleau-Ponty would call “high altitude” thinking, is precisely that which Merleau-Ponty is aiming at when he points at the pre-objective present which is the basis upon which thetic intentionality can function at all. It is therefore the case that this “high altitude” thinking seems to undermine its own claims to objective validity, when it fails to notice that it is erected upon a “pyramid of time” sexual energies, mistaken utterances and even possibly erroneous conclusions. In short, we reckon with all that is given explicitly and that which is not explicit, that which is simply operant in every effort to express, act, or engage with others and the world we share. What we project, in the first place, is the same thing we encounter again and again in every reflection, in every attempt to step back from the flux and arrest its flow if even for a moment, and that is a world which comes before me and yet which I effect with my own movement and the movements of others. The world is always given in advance as part of my unfolding which is the movement of time.
Monday, May 3, 2010
Merleau-Ponty- "The Phenomenology of Perception" III
The chapter on the “Body in its Sexual Being” must be understood as an elaboration of the notion of “motor power,” or “motor intentionality,” outlined in the chapter on “The Spatiality of One’s Own Body and Motility.” That is to say, that if we took Merleau-Ponty seriously when he claimed that all motor action, or movement, has a background, or rather that the background is immanent within the movement itself, then it follows that in his treatment of sexuality he is making this background explicit. In other words the background exists as a field of significance, and rather than being some kind of representational projection, it would be a kind immanent intentionality operating in simultaneity with the body’s motility. The point Merleau-Ponty is attempting to make is that we do not simply encounter a world, as it were from some neutral perspective, but rather we are always already an opening onto the world from somewhere. When Merleau-Ponty says that there must be an ‘Eros’ or a ‘Libido’ which “breathes life” into bodily existence he is gesturing towards the inescapable fact that sexuality, or sexual life, is an ‘original intentionality.’ If we attend to the sexual field that is deployed in perceptual experience it becomes relevant to say that in desire, that is in a desirous moment of silence, we come to appropriate the world, and entities encountered therein, erotically. It seems to be the case, even further, that by engaging with the experience in this way, that is by naming the experience erotic, we have already taken leave of the experience and entered the realm of the objective where this field of experience seems unproblematic, or determinate. How can we speak of this realm of experience without distorting it, without abstracting from what it gives us? The body is simultaneously my ability to take up the sexual experience, as it is given in its ambiguity, and also my ability to step back from it and abstract, or speak of it making it manifest in the order of determinate things. It seems to be the case, therefore, that there is a sexual field deployed indeterminately, upon which, the objective, or determinate order is established. The only way to take up this pre-objective attitude, this ambiguous texture of experience, is to live it. The body is the site of the interweaving between existence and sexuality such that their limits overlap and intersect. We are, as it were, at the site of undecidability, that is, we have emerged at the place where it no longer makes sense to attempt to distinguish between the phenomenal, nor the sexual field, they are ambiguously co-present.
If metaphysics is“–the coming to light of something beyond nature–” then sexuality would have metaphysical significance. The body as it opens upon others is fundamentally sexual, that is it uncovers the world in the ambiguity of a sexual field. Desire, love, modesty and shame articulate a metaphysics of the world as it is uncovered in embodiment. We cannot isolate the sexual kernel from the general unfolding of experience it is part of the texture, the fabric, or the style of existence. In transcending ourselves when encountering the other in a movement of existence we come across the other as desirable, repulsive, as stimulating perhaps even in ways beyond our capacity to name The point is that these ways are simply operant in our perception such that it seems to be true to say that in order to adopt the rationalist, or idealist perspective we must completely forget the fact of our existing and ignore the metaphysics of the everyday layer of experience. The indeterminacy of existence is not some accident, or mistake in perception, it is the metaphysics of perception itself.
If metaphysics is“–the coming to light of something beyond nature–” then sexuality would have metaphysical significance. The body as it opens upon others is fundamentally sexual, that is it uncovers the world in the ambiguity of a sexual field. Desire, love, modesty and shame articulate a metaphysics of the world as it is uncovered in embodiment. We cannot isolate the sexual kernel from the general unfolding of experience it is part of the texture, the fabric, or the style of existence. In transcending ourselves when encountering the other in a movement of existence we come across the other as desirable, repulsive, as stimulating perhaps even in ways beyond our capacity to name The point is that these ways are simply operant in our perception such that it seems to be true to say that in order to adopt the rationalist, or idealist perspective we must completely forget the fact of our existing and ignore the metaphysics of the everyday layer of experience. The indeterminacy of existence is not some accident, or mistake in perception, it is the metaphysics of perception itself.
Merleau-Ponty- "The Phenomenology of Perception" II
The body is an intentional structure in that it is always already an engaged perspective. There is no view from nowhere, which we might have access to, or invoke, such that the world and all the phenomena therein might be accounted for as third person processes, objectively and for all-time. For Merleau-Ponty, the body guarantees our involvement in the ‘here’ and ‘now,’ even though it might be difficult to say just what is meant by this ‘here’ and this ‘now.’ It seems important to say, however, that we already encounter them in some way before we come to see them as questionable. It is our being-in-the-world that allows us to engage with a ‘here’ and ‘now’ without having to ask what they are, without having to provide ourselves with an account of their constitution, they are, as it were, taken pre-reflectively. To say that “the body is the vehicle of being in the world” is to point to the body as the location of this pre-reflective engagement with the world. The body is, therefore, both that which we are, as perceiving subjects, and the view or perspective from which we see the world. Merleau-Ponty’s primary criticism of the physiological and psychological accounts of embodiment is that they come on the scene too late and have already missed that which has been given in the movement of being-in-the-world. The pathological phenomena of phantom limb and anosognosia reveal the primacy of being-in-the-world in the act of perception and the body as the seat of perception.
Merleau-Ponty’s account of the phenomena of the phantom limb and anosognosia emerges from his dialectical engagement with the physiological and psychological accounts of the same phenomena. His account of being-in-the-world, as a pre-objective view of the world and phenomena therein, is a mediation between the failures of the physiological and psychological accounts. By placing being-in-the-world firmly in the unified structure of the body, the body becomes the invisible center of perception. In this sense, the availability of the body’s capacities would be that which is most often taken for granted in our everyday way of being-in-the-world. The body is, therefore, the product of biological and cultural inheritance. Furthermore, each particular moment brings with it the entirety of my past and the past of the species. The body is, therefore, both a personal and practical field and the anonymous field of a body in general. Explained through being-in-the-world, the phenomenon of phantom limb appears as the pathological adherence to a world wherein the absent limb would still be available and afford itself to our intentions. Similarly, in the case of anosognosia, the subject is pre-refectively aware of a deficiency on the level of his being-in-the-world, but simply refuses to reflect upon it in order not to feel the absence. Merleau-Ponty’s account upsets the traditional account, which suffers from the prejudice of presence, by returning to the layer of lived experience, which encounters the body as an “I can”.
Merleau-Ponty’s account of the phenomena of the phantom limb and anosognosia emerges from his dialectical engagement with the physiological and psychological accounts of the same phenomena. His account of being-in-the-world, as a pre-objective view of the world and phenomena therein, is a mediation between the failures of the physiological and psychological accounts. By placing being-in-the-world firmly in the unified structure of the body, the body becomes the invisible center of perception. In this sense, the availability of the body’s capacities would be that which is most often taken for granted in our everyday way of being-in-the-world. The body is, therefore, the product of biological and cultural inheritance. Furthermore, each particular moment brings with it the entirety of my past and the past of the species. The body is, therefore, both a personal and practical field and the anonymous field of a body in general. Explained through being-in-the-world, the phenomenon of phantom limb appears as the pathological adherence to a world wherein the absent limb would still be available and afford itself to our intentions. Similarly, in the case of anosognosia, the subject is pre-refectively aware of a deficiency on the level of his being-in-the-world, but simply refuses to reflect upon it in order not to feel the absence. Merleau-Ponty’s account upsets the traditional account, which suffers from the prejudice of presence, by returning to the layer of lived experience, which encounters the body as an “I can”.
Merleau-Ponty- "The Phenomenology of Perception" I
The movement of the first time, the establishment of a new a priori, a sense-organ. The movement, which allows me to go further, to reorganize the background from whence this perception emerged as intelligible, as something to be understood. Paramount to the account Merleau-Ponty gives us, is that Perception is an originating realm and that the body is that strange unity which is both ‘intentional’ (toward things), and ‘sense-giving’ (constitutive of those things). The body is the site between the movement of active constitution and passive appropriation. This movement is our movement, the ‘founding relation’ whereby we come to have recourse to something like the sedimentation of an a priori. What comes to light in the movement of the “first perception,” in the truth of the first time? Furthermore, how does this experience fit into his criticism of the intellectualist and empiricist accounts?
In the first place, we would come across colours upon a different sort of background, a background which is the projection of a sedimented history, something like the history of our experiences to date. While colours would not yet form any part of our perceptual experience, in the truth of the first time, we would gain access to them as a kind of indeterminate experience. Faced with the ambiguity of the indeterminate experience we would take it up into ourselves, in a movement of appropriation, such that the background, or the history of our experience to date will be altered in the wake of this novel experience. In this movement, the movement between the passive encounter with the first appearance of colour, and its appropriation into the now altered structure of consciousness, we render the indeterminate content of experience determinate. The structure of consciousness has been altered in the wake of this movement, in view of its capacity to understand, or reactivate the truth of the first colour experience. This experience opens up a new dimension of possible experience; it is in this sense that Merleau-Ponty invokes the notion of horizons and the possibility of extending or broadening their scope. It is the case, therefore, that every subsequent encounter with colour will be founded upon the truth of the first time. The establishment of a necessary structure, an a priori, in turn assures that the truth of the first time remains present every time. This is not to say that this structure is static, or does not undergo alterations and refinements of its own, but rather that each subsequent colour experience is already understood in terms of the a priori sedimented in the appropriation of the inaugurating experience.
This account is essential to the sustained critique of the intellectualist and empiricist traditions, in that it provides and account of learning which is suspiciously absent in either account. Merleau-Ponty provides an account about how it is that we come to understand the world in terms of the experiences we have therein. We do not perceive things in the world as a kind of ‘tabula rasa,’ but rather as already part of a tradition, which interprets. It is therefore the case that even in our founding movements, in the truths of the inaugural perceptions they are already part of a framework, or background of previously interpreted phenomena. For Merleau-Ponty, among the primary task seems to be an attempt to get behind, or perhaps underneath these inaugural experiences in order to make manifest the layers of a priori sedimentation that contribute to the interpretation of indeterminate phenomena in certain determinate ways.
In the first place, we would come across colours upon a different sort of background, a background which is the projection of a sedimented history, something like the history of our experiences to date. While colours would not yet form any part of our perceptual experience, in the truth of the first time, we would gain access to them as a kind of indeterminate experience. Faced with the ambiguity of the indeterminate experience we would take it up into ourselves, in a movement of appropriation, such that the background, or the history of our experience to date will be altered in the wake of this novel experience. In this movement, the movement between the passive encounter with the first appearance of colour, and its appropriation into the now altered structure of consciousness, we render the indeterminate content of experience determinate. The structure of consciousness has been altered in the wake of this movement, in view of its capacity to understand, or reactivate the truth of the first colour experience. This experience opens up a new dimension of possible experience; it is in this sense that Merleau-Ponty invokes the notion of horizons and the possibility of extending or broadening their scope. It is the case, therefore, that every subsequent encounter with colour will be founded upon the truth of the first time. The establishment of a necessary structure, an a priori, in turn assures that the truth of the first time remains present every time. This is not to say that this structure is static, or does not undergo alterations and refinements of its own, but rather that each subsequent colour experience is already understood in terms of the a priori sedimented in the appropriation of the inaugurating experience.
This account is essential to the sustained critique of the intellectualist and empiricist traditions, in that it provides and account of learning which is suspiciously absent in either account. Merleau-Ponty provides an account about how it is that we come to understand the world in terms of the experiences we have therein. We do not perceive things in the world as a kind of ‘tabula rasa,’ but rather as already part of a tradition, which interprets. It is therefore the case that even in our founding movements, in the truths of the inaugural perceptions they are already part of a framework, or background of previously interpreted phenomena. For Merleau-Ponty, among the primary task seems to be an attempt to get behind, or perhaps underneath these inaugural experiences in order to make manifest the layers of a priori sedimentation that contribute to the interpretation of indeterminate phenomena in certain determinate ways.
Heidegger- "Being and Time" VI
Heidegger’s temporal interpretation of understanding is part of his attempt to make manifest the temporal constitution of the structure of care. The understanding is an existentiale part of the structure of care. As such, if we are to determine the temporal constitution of care, the existentiale structures, which together constitute care as a unified phenomenon, must themselves be capable of unfolding within the same temporality as care itself. The understanding, treated in this manner, can be treated ontologically as something in flow, in the process of unfolding, a structure whose completion is “not-yet.” Taken as an object in a cognitivist account, the understanding is already determinate, in other words, no longer in flux. In the cognitivist account of the understanding, it is as a completed structure, having already accomplished itself as content in the movement of understanding. As understood by the cognitivist, there is no way to maintain the understanding as a possibility; as such the understanding is always already inauthentic in the Heideggerian sense. The temporal interpretation of understanding is significant in that it is possible to view the understanding as a pre-cognitive structure which is livingly enacted in the world always already involved in the interpretive temporal unfolding of a horizon.
The temporal horizon, in the account of the understanding is taken ecstatically in the sense that it is taken as primarily composed of a past present and a future. The understanding is for the most part a futural structure in that it is always already engaged in projecting its possibilities into the future. It is always ahead of itself in its projections. In “anticipation” the understanding is authentically projecting its possibilities as possibilities. Inauthentically, the understanding simply “awaits” the realization of itself in possibilities, which have been given to it in advance. The present, taken in resoluteness, is authentic in that it remains resolute in the face of the unrealized projections, or possibilities of the understanding. The present, taken inauthentically, makes present the ‘now’ as something present at hand. The past taken resolutely remains possible as a repetition, as something, which remains a possible projection into the future. Inauthentically, the past is forgotten and is closed, or settled the way things are settled in everydayness. In each case we have an understanding, which can close, or allow itself to be determined by the inauthenticity of the given ways of being. Or, it can maintain itself as an authentic possibility of itself in the sense that it can remain open to the projection of its own possibilities.
The understanding, as understood from the horizon of temporality, gives the understanding to itself as something to be understood. In other words as the understanding projects itself into the future and, in turn, faces itself as that towards which it is on the way. The understanding therefore encounters itself temporally as something to be understood.
The temporal horizon, in the account of the understanding is taken ecstatically in the sense that it is taken as primarily composed of a past present and a future. The understanding is for the most part a futural structure in that it is always already engaged in projecting its possibilities into the future. It is always ahead of itself in its projections. In “anticipation” the understanding is authentically projecting its possibilities as possibilities. Inauthentically, the understanding simply “awaits” the realization of itself in possibilities, which have been given to it in advance. The present, taken in resoluteness, is authentic in that it remains resolute in the face of the unrealized projections, or possibilities of the understanding. The present, taken inauthentically, makes present the ‘now’ as something present at hand. The past taken resolutely remains possible as a repetition, as something, which remains a possible projection into the future. Inauthentically, the past is forgotten and is closed, or settled the way things are settled in everydayness. In each case we have an understanding, which can close, or allow itself to be determined by the inauthenticity of the given ways of being. Or, it can maintain itself as an authentic possibility of itself in the sense that it can remain open to the projection of its own possibilities.
The understanding, as understood from the horizon of temporality, gives the understanding to itself as something to be understood. In other words as the understanding projects itself into the future and, in turn, faces itself as that towards which it is on the way. The understanding therefore encounters itself temporally as something to be understood.
Heidegger- "Being and Time" V
“anticipatory resoluteness” we are presented with a structure, which is simultaneously active and passive. That is to say we are forced to reckon with a structure, which is an actively engaged passivity. In order to expand upon what this active passivity might entail, that is in order to engage with ‘how’ it operates, we must first turn to the ‘what’ of “anticipatory resoluteness.” In anticipation, Dasein anticipates the arrival of the ‘not-yet,’ which is at once a coming to-be, that is a possibility of Dasein, and an already having been authentically. If, as we have seen, Dasein is already its ‘not-yet,’ how does Dasein encounter the ‘not’ of the ‘not-yet,’ how does it encounter the non-relational aspect of its possibility? The call of conscience is Dasein’s call to itself. In other words care, as the structure of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, calls forth Dasein to own up, or become responsible for the ownmost possibility of its being. Being-guilty, is the phenomenon of being-responsible for the ‘not-yet’ the nothing, which makes possible our Being-in-the-world and only manifest in the light of Dasein as a whole. In our everyday way of Being this phenomenon gets passed over or stays hidden, concealed, in our dealings with ourselves, others, and the world, in the inauthentic mode of das man. The call of conscience brings the phenomenon of Being-guilty out of concealment such that we might actively take it up as an authentic possibility. If we are attentive to its movement we are able to treat this structure in a manner similar to the structure of Being-towards-death; that is, as an opening towards the possibility of the authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole of Dasein. In attending to the call, that is in understanding the call, Dasein finds itself there, wanting to have a conscience, such that the Self is called forth in its Being-Guilty. This phenomenon, once again, similar to Heidegger’s account of Being-toward-death, authentically, appears as anxiety in the face of the ‘not-yet.’
Resoluteness is precisely the projection of Dasein’s Self–not the they-self of das man–towards its Being-guilty as resolved even in the face of anxiety. Anxiety, which once again appears in the face of the ‘not-yet’ as the possibility of impossibility of Dasein. As such it makes sense when Heidegger states that “Only when it ‘qualifies’ itself as Being-towards-death does resoluteness understand the ‘can’ of its potentiality-for-Being guilty” (BT- 306). In other words it is only in resoluteness, which is a way of actively or resolvedly letting oneself be, can death be taken up as a possibility. In order for this active passivity to be lived we must turn to the structure of anticipation that is seemingly already implied in resoluteness itself. It is only in Being-towards-the-end, that is Being-towards-death, as a kind of running ahead to the totality, that resoluteness can manifest the authentic potentiality of its Being in the structure of Being-towards-death as anticipation. It is therefore the case that only in anticipation can Dasein’s Being-guilty be taken as an opening as the structure of the ‘not-yet.’ It is only through “anticipatory resoluteness” that Dasein can disclose itself and the world authentically in terms of its potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. In each case anticipation at once encounters the non-relational, the possibility of impossibility, as a possibility. Anticipation discloses the possibility of Dasein’s primordial Being-towards-death as possible. “As Being-towards-the-end which understands–that is to say, as anticipation of death–resoluteness becomes authentically what it can be” (BT-305). To adopt this actively passive stance we would continuously take possession of ourselves as a whole. A whole in-terms-of-which and for-the-sake-of-which are.
Resoluteness is precisely the projection of Dasein’s Self–not the they-self of das man–towards its Being-guilty as resolved even in the face of anxiety. Anxiety, which once again appears in the face of the ‘not-yet’ as the possibility of impossibility of Dasein. As such it makes sense when Heidegger states that “Only when it ‘qualifies’ itself as Being-towards-death does resoluteness understand the ‘can’ of its potentiality-for-Being guilty” (BT- 306). In other words it is only in resoluteness, which is a way of actively or resolvedly letting oneself be, can death be taken up as a possibility. In order for this active passivity to be lived we must turn to the structure of anticipation that is seemingly already implied in resoluteness itself. It is only in Being-towards-the-end, that is Being-towards-death, as a kind of running ahead to the totality, that resoluteness can manifest the authentic potentiality of its Being in the structure of Being-towards-death as anticipation. It is therefore the case that only in anticipation can Dasein’s Being-guilty be taken as an opening as the structure of the ‘not-yet.’ It is only through “anticipatory resoluteness” that Dasein can disclose itself and the world authentically in terms of its potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. In each case anticipation at once encounters the non-relational, the possibility of impossibility, as a possibility. Anticipation discloses the possibility of Dasein’s primordial Being-towards-death as possible. “As Being-towards-the-end which understands–that is to say, as anticipation of death–resoluteness becomes authentically what it can be” (BT-305). To adopt this actively passive stance we would continuously take possession of ourselves as a whole. A whole in-terms-of-which and for-the-sake-of-which are.
Heidegger- "Being and Time" IV
We are, as it were, presented with an absolute opening. We act into this opening, attempting to close it off with our actions, our words, and our projects. We act as if it were possible to name the opening, as if we could finally say what it is, and that it is this way or that. But we are constantly thrust back; the opening remains open so that we may go further and, were the opening to close, our possibilities would close with it. The structure that Heidegger elucidates is the paradoxical structure of Dasein, such that when Heidegger states enigmatically, “Dasein is already its “not-yet””, (BT 245) he already has the totalized structure in view; the finitude of Dasein which possesses within itself a kernel of the infinite. What is this “not-yet”? Does it not mark the impossibility of a closed structure? Is it an “end,” which is at the same time an opening, allowing us to go further? To say that Dasein is already its “not-yet” is simply to point to the fact that Dasein is already ahead of itself in being towards its possibilities. Dasein always has the possibility of going beyond, of going further. In the “not-yet”, we are presented with a kernel of the future, that which evades interpretation, that which allows us to continue onward. The Being of Dasein is a Being-towards the future, towards the radical opening, which is at the same time the “end” toward which Dasein exists. The “not-yet,” always remains outstanding, always evades Dasein’s attempt to settle the matter or provide it with a definitive interpretation. Dasein is its to-be as a projection of its possibilities into the world, towards that which it is “not-yet.” Dasein is already this “not-yet” insofar as it is already its possibility. If we turn specifically to the notions of “totality,” “end” and “death,” we are in each case faced with a structure similar to that of the “not-yet.” We are not, as it were, presented with events, it is not literally the event of death, which Heidegger is invoking, nor is it “demise” in the Heideggerian sense, and neither is the ‘end’ a kind of finality or last moment. In each case what is important is what Heidegger calls the Being-towards, which is the way of the Being of Dasein.
If we are attentive to the movement Heidegger outlines, we can see that the whole is presupposed and that the structure is never closed until we ourselves are at-an-end, until the event of our “demise.” It is therefore the case that death reveals that by living towards the “not-yet” we are, as it were, living towards the infinite opening in the structure of Being. Death reveals this possibility by making manifest the “possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein” (BT 251). In other words Dasein is presented with the possibility of its own impossibility. Death forces Dasein to reckon with its own finitude – a finitude from which it cannot escape. It is the case however, that this reckoning goes further, in the sense that Dasein is forced to face its “ownmost” possibility, that towards-which it has no capacity to relate; it is precisely the inability to relate. Even further as possibility, this kind of reckoning reveals to Dasein the impossibility of its going beyond even though it can envisage a beyond all the same. Dasein is thrown towards a possibility to which it cannot relate and cannot overcome; it is thrust upon the end of itself. Dasein is always already its end when it reckons in this way, in that it always completes itself in the movement of reckoning. However, until it’s demise, it continuously finds itself disposed, able to go further to beyond itself. This way of Being-towards-death makes manifest the possibility of Dasein’s Being-futural as a kind of temporal unfolding in time.
If we are attentive to the movement Heidegger outlines, we can see that the whole is presupposed and that the structure is never closed until we ourselves are at-an-end, until the event of our “demise.” It is therefore the case that death reveals that by living towards the “not-yet” we are, as it were, living towards the infinite opening in the structure of Being. Death reveals this possibility by making manifest the “possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein” (BT 251). In other words Dasein is presented with the possibility of its own impossibility. Death forces Dasein to reckon with its own finitude – a finitude from which it cannot escape. It is the case however, that this reckoning goes further, in the sense that Dasein is forced to face its “ownmost” possibility, that towards-which it has no capacity to relate; it is precisely the inability to relate. Even further as possibility, this kind of reckoning reveals to Dasein the impossibility of its going beyond even though it can envisage a beyond all the same. Dasein is thrown towards a possibility to which it cannot relate and cannot overcome; it is thrust upon the end of itself. Dasein is always already its end when it reckons in this way, in that it always completes itself in the movement of reckoning. However, until it’s demise, it continuously finds itself disposed, able to go further to beyond itself. This way of Being-towards-death makes manifest the possibility of Dasein’s Being-futural as a kind of temporal unfolding in time.
Heidegger- "Being and Time" III
In order to attend to what Heidegger outlines in his discussion of interpretation, the ‘as’ structure, and meaning, we must first be able to attend to the structure of the understanding itself. What is required, therefore, is a certain kind of attention, a way of seeing, or an attentiveness to the understanding, such that it comes to light, or is made manifest, in terms of itself. Through this kind of attentiveness, we might be able to grasp the understanding, as it were, understandingly, in terms of the possibilities it projects. Attention, mindfulness, or a vision of this sort, cannot be a presuppositionless undertaking, but rather must base itself upon the very understanding it seeks to attend to. This movement, which we are now attuned to–this movement of becoming attentive, the cultivation of our interpretive powers–is precisely the move Heidegger would have us attend to. The understanding is essentially circular in that the fore-structures of the understanding are the ground from which the interpretation interprets. By becoming attentive, by recognizing the hermeneutic circle, we are able to cultivate the movement of interpretation such that the fore-structures of the understanding might unfold in light of a responsibility to the things themselves. The understanding is a projection of Dasein’s possibilities, or fore-structures, which it may, or may not, attend to in an interpretive way, that is to say, meaningfully. In other words the understanding is always already engaged meaningfully when it comes to interpret the fore-structures of the understanding. Through this circle, we are provided with the ontological structure of meaning.
If we attend carefully to the movement that Heidegger unfolds–and to the attention we are able to give to it–we see that through our attentiveness we do not add anything to the understanding that wasn’t already there in advance, rather we realize the understanding in terms of the possibilities it already has. We must keep in mind the structure of the ready-to-hand– encountered circumspectively in terms of the ‘in-order-to’ that it possesses in reference to a totality of equipment– with which the understanding is always already actively involved. The understanding engages with ready-to-hand entities in terms of the background, the totality of involvements, the world of significance, which is a shared one. The understanding occurs, as it were, pre-cognitively, as a kind of pre-thematic engagement with the shared world. The prefix ‘pre’, does not mean to suggest that this way of engaging with the world must necessarily be thematized, but rather, that it always possesses this as a possibility of itself. When Heidegger says that, “in interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It becomes itself” (MR, 188) he is pointing to the movement whereby interpretation accomplishes the understanding as something. The ‘as’ structure of interpretation is such that it is already involved in the unfolding of Dasein in terms of a totality of involvements, and opens up the possibility of making explicit the meaning structures latent therein. If this world of significance is indeed a shared one, as Heidegger suggests it is, then how often are we given over to the interpretations of others? How often do we engage in the movement of interpretation and surrender ourselves to the ready-made interpretations? It is only through this movement of becoming attentive that we are able to engage with the strange movement of the hermeneutic circle.
If we attend carefully to the movement that Heidegger unfolds–and to the attention we are able to give to it–we see that through our attentiveness we do not add anything to the understanding that wasn’t already there in advance, rather we realize the understanding in terms of the possibilities it already has. We must keep in mind the structure of the ready-to-hand– encountered circumspectively in terms of the ‘in-order-to’ that it possesses in reference to a totality of equipment– with which the understanding is always already actively involved. The understanding engages with ready-to-hand entities in terms of the background, the totality of involvements, the world of significance, which is a shared one. The understanding occurs, as it were, pre-cognitively, as a kind of pre-thematic engagement with the shared world. The prefix ‘pre’, does not mean to suggest that this way of engaging with the world must necessarily be thematized, but rather, that it always possesses this as a possibility of itself. When Heidegger says that, “in interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It becomes itself” (MR, 188) he is pointing to the movement whereby interpretation accomplishes the understanding as something. The ‘as’ structure of interpretation is such that it is already involved in the unfolding of Dasein in terms of a totality of involvements, and opens up the possibility of making explicit the meaning structures latent therein. If this world of significance is indeed a shared one, as Heidegger suggests it is, then how often are we given over to the interpretations of others? How often do we engage in the movement of interpretation and surrender ourselves to the ready-made interpretations? It is only through this movement of becoming attentive that we are able to engage with the strange movement of the hermeneutic circle.
Heidegger- "Being in Time" II
If we are attentive to Heidegger’s formulation, we are, as it were, presented with the gradual unfolding of an account or an Interpretation of the Being of Dasein. An account whose promise is not yet present, and whose unfolding is on its way towards the possibility of something like a fundamental ontology. The existential analytic has thus far uncovered the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Furthermore, this Being-in-the-world has thus far been encountered in terms of a “circumspective absorption in references and assignments constitutive for the readiness-to-hand of a totality of equipment.” In other words Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, as concern, takes place in an environment wherein Dasein finds itself always already located in a meaningful way. As such, Dasein’s way of Being is always already located in meaningful contexts within which it unfolds its possibilities. In this particular passage, Heidegger points toward a kind of intentionality far more basic than the intentionality previously articulated by the tradition. It is an intentionality that is, quite simply, operant in the sense that Dasein is always already meaningfully engaged with the world.
Circumspection, if we attend to Heidegger’s formulation, is a non-theoretical way of ‘seeing’ which discloses entities in the world in a certain way. In other words, when Dasein is at its best it engages or is involved in a context, or environment, which it already understands circumspectively. Even further, ready-to-hand entities are always encountered circumspectively in terms of their ‘in-order-to’ functions. Or, in other words, the ready-to-hand entities, which Heidegger calls ‘equipment,’ are always already rendered determinate in terms of their ‘references’ and ‘ assignments.’ These ‘references’ and ‘assignments’ are already determined in light of the totality of equipment, or the world wherein and within which they appear. As such the ready-to-hand, as opposed to the present-at-hand, is not a thing which we might examine in terms of its properties, nor something we might subject to some kind of theoretical account of its nature. Rather, it is something we would encounter in the flow of our unfolding, such that it would afford itself to something we are already engaged in. For example, we would not need to think of the hammer in order to nail two boards together, rather the hammer would simply offer itself, as if assigned to our intention, to hammer in a kind of effortless movement a seemingly thoughtless way of skillfully engaging with the world. Furthermore, hammers would make no sense circumspectively in a world without nails and boards and things that require hammering. As such hammers make no sense outside a context of reference to the equipmental totality.
Being-in-the-world, has thus far presented itself as a meaningful way of being situated. It is, as Heidegger articulates it, a way of coping with the world pre-reflexively in light of the activity we are already engaged in, namely the activity of Being-in-the-world. As such, we encounter equipment, which offers itself to our understanding gaze, in terms of the possibilities it affords and the totality of equipment from which it comes. Any attempt to speak, or say what it is we are doing, or any failure in the performance of the task will draw us out of the state wherein we find ourselves already meaningfully engaged and place us before present-at-hand items and contexts which we seem to no longer understand.
Circumspection, if we attend to Heidegger’s formulation, is a non-theoretical way of ‘seeing’ which discloses entities in the world in a certain way. In other words, when Dasein is at its best it engages or is involved in a context, or environment, which it already understands circumspectively. Even further, ready-to-hand entities are always encountered circumspectively in terms of their ‘in-order-to’ functions. Or, in other words, the ready-to-hand entities, which Heidegger calls ‘equipment,’ are always already rendered determinate in terms of their ‘references’ and ‘ assignments.’ These ‘references’ and ‘assignments’ are already determined in light of the totality of equipment, or the world wherein and within which they appear. As such the ready-to-hand, as opposed to the present-at-hand, is not a thing which we might examine in terms of its properties, nor something we might subject to some kind of theoretical account of its nature. Rather, it is something we would encounter in the flow of our unfolding, such that it would afford itself to something we are already engaged in. For example, we would not need to think of the hammer in order to nail two boards together, rather the hammer would simply offer itself, as if assigned to our intention, to hammer in a kind of effortless movement a seemingly thoughtless way of skillfully engaging with the world. Furthermore, hammers would make no sense circumspectively in a world without nails and boards and things that require hammering. As such hammers make no sense outside a context of reference to the equipmental totality.
Being-in-the-world, has thus far presented itself as a meaningful way of being situated. It is, as Heidegger articulates it, a way of coping with the world pre-reflexively in light of the activity we are already engaged in, namely the activity of Being-in-the-world. As such, we encounter equipment, which offers itself to our understanding gaze, in terms of the possibilities it affords and the totality of equipment from which it comes. Any attempt to speak, or say what it is we are doing, or any failure in the performance of the task will draw us out of the state wherein we find ourselves already meaningfully engaged and place us before present-at-hand items and contexts which we seem to no longer understand.
Heidegger- "Being and Time" I
Heidegger begins with the question “What is meant by “Being-in”?” Taking this question as his point of departure, Heidegger proceeds to demonstrate how this question has been answered incorrectly by the Cartesian tradition. In the first place, this way of proceeding intends to demonstrate that for the most part, Dasein’s Being-in has been taken ontically in the sense of being something merely present-at-hand alongside other present-at-hand entities in the world. As such, the Cartesian tradition has passed over a much more basic phenomenon of Being-in-the-world as an a priori state of the Being of Dasein. Due to the absence of the ontological question, Being-in has for the most part been taken to be “knowing the world” grounded in a subjectivity which encounters a world of objects. Heidegger treats Being-in equiprimordially, or in such a way that its essence may not be given in any single modality of its Being. Furthermore, because Dasein’s Being-in-the-World, a particular modality of Being-in, is for the most part presupposed ontically it is most often veiled ontologically or understood negatively in terms of entities which it itself is not. By proceeding, as it were, apophatically, Heidegger will attempt to uncover a positive characterization of Being-in-the-world, not as something present at hand but as state of Dasein’s Being.
If we take Being-in, as Heidegger suggests, to have a dual meaning–both the sense of a location, or a dwelling alongside, and a kind of absorption, or concern for that dwelling–then the world would be the space wherein Dasein finds itself concernfully located. Dasein is principally absorption in the world, or in other words Dasein always already has a world. We are, as it were, faced with a departure from the Cartesian tradition, which has taken Dasein’s relation to the world to be one of a knower to the objects of knowledge. In Heidegger’s account Dasein’s Being-in is inseparable from World in that Dasein always already understands itself in terms of its environment, which constitutes a kind of field of familiarity to which Dasein has recourse. Notice that this Being-in-the-World is not a theoretical standing before, nor an epistemological relation between a subject and a world of objects but an existential modality of Dasein’s Being-in.
Dasein, therefore, is always already concernfully situated in the world and always already understands itself environmentally in terms of a totality of possible involvements. Dasein’s Being-in-the-World, is not conceived nor perceived in a manner present-at-hand, but rather, Dasein is always already Being-in-the-World. Dasein’s facticity is such that it comports itself in terms of the entities it finds within the world, and expresses itself in terms of its Being-in-the-World as its primary mode of Being.
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