“A self-consciousness exists for a self-consciousness. Only so is it in fact self-consciousness; for only in this way does the unity of itself in its otherness become explicit for it. The ‘I’ which is the object of its Notion is in fact not ‘object’; the object of Desire, however, is only independent, for it is the universal indestructible substance, the fluid self-identical essence. A self-consciousness, in being an object, is just as much ‘I’ as ‘object’. With this, we already have before us the Notion of Spirit. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is—this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousness which in their opposition enjoy perfect freedom and independence: ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’.”[1]
How are we to make sense of the notion of Hegelian freedom? How is it that freedom finally emerges in the Hegelian account as “enmeshed in servitude”?[2] What has Hegel given us in “Lordship and Bondage”? If we attend to the quote above we are struck by its density, furthermore, if we attend to it carefully we might find the announcement of a departure, a properly Hegelian account of the status of self-knowledge. This departure is radical in the sense that we are no longer faced with an account of consciousness as the passive apprehension of the world. Rather, it is an account of the activity of self-consciousness, not as an epistemological subject, but as an active agent in the world populated by a multiplicity of agents, that is an individual subject acting within a social totality. We have shifted away from an account of the knowing subject to an account of intersubjectivity. Is this not what is meant by the Notion of Spirit, “a self-consciousness, in being an object, is just as much ‘I’ as ‘object’.”[3] Are we not faced with a structure, which seems to have structured Hegel’s account from the beginning? The structure, which holds together the moments of independence and dependence, necessity and contingency, being-for-self and being-for-another, or even, the fictional perfection of “the ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’.”[4] Perhaps, without going any further, in a wholly naïve way, we have already answered our initial question of how freedom might develop from out of slavery; how this structure, this Notion of Spirit, somehow maintains the contradiction in a more or less balanced way, perhaps always falling short of perfection.
The following essay began as an attempt to perhaps say what it is that Hegel gives us in the section on “Lordship and Bondage.” It has since become increasingly evident that this is not the proper way to proceed if we are to attend to anything of relevance when we attend to the section on “Lordship and Bondage.” As such, the following examination will take the position that, with the dialectic of “Lordship and Bondage,” we are presented with a structure of recognition, although falling far short of the Notion of recognition,[5] enables the subject to overcome the presence of Nature from within itself and the Natural world from without. As such, from a purely historical perspective we are presented with the first truly social institution, or of the first instance of human institutionality as such. In “Lordship and Bondage,” Hegel, is furthermore, giving us an account of the structure of self-consciousness, which is at once both historical and psychological, which, without establishing it, brings about the necessity for an objective point of view. As such the “Lordship and Bondage” dialectic is a primitive moment in the overcoming of Nature towards the development of Spirit.
What therefore, does the account of “Lordship and Bondage” seek to accomplish? The tendency, in many cases, has been to take the section out of its context, that is, to remove it from the larger context of self-consciousness in general and see it as an end in itself rather than a moment in the movement of Spirit. Let us turn then toward the notion of self-consciousness in order to provide us with a trajectory.
“The notion of self-consciousness is only completed in these three moments: (a) the pure undifferentiated ‘I’ as its first immediate object. (b) But this immediacy is itself an absolute mediation, it is only as a supersession of the independent object, in other words, it is Desire. The satisfaction of Desire is, it is true, the reflection of self-consciousness into itself, or the certainty that has become truth. (c) But the truth of this certainty is really a double reflection, the duplication of self-consciousness.[6]
It seems clear, therefore, if we are attentive to the three moments of self-consciousness, that the structure encountered in the dialectic of “Lordship and Bondage” must bring together these three moments. Perhaps, stated otherwise, it must bring together the for-itself of Life, the organic totality, which maintains its sameness in difference. Life is the immediate undifferentiated ‘I,’ a relation to the world that excludes all otherness, it is the passive moment of pure apprehension. Desire is essential to the movement, “self-consciousness is Desire”[7] and it will be the failure to satisfy Desire that pushes the dialectic forward. The structure of Desire is explicated with particular salience by Alexandre Kojève:
“In contrast to the knowledge that keeps man in a passive quietude, Desire dis-quiets him and moves him to action. Born of Desire action tends to satisfy it, and can do so only by the “negation,” the destruction, or at least transformation, of the desired object: to satisfy hunger, for example, food must be destroyed or, in any case, transformed.[8]
The negative structure of Desire is such that it eliminates, or negates otherness, all action, therefore, reduces, or consumes otherness and reduces it to sameness. Desire, however, is a negative structure as such it can only negate and cannot overcome the negated other, as such it must reproduce both the object and the other repeatedly. Self-consciousness can be certain of itself only through the overcoming of an independent life. If we follow the structure, Desire can only be satisfied by an object which in turn is capable of negating itself, that is Desire can only be satisfied by another self-consciousness. It is therefore the case that the failure to satisfy Desire has led us to its possible satisfaction in the Notion of Recognition. The account of “Lordship and Bondage,” must bring together these three moments in the establishment of a genuinely social context.
The Notion of recognition allows for the satisfaction of Desire, that is it allows Desire to establish its self-certainty as truth. Recognition, therefore, must allow for the doubling of self-consciousness, that is only an action that is equal and by another self-consciousness can bring about the Desired result, which is mutual recognition of an other as equal and independent, the recognition of the other in its freedom. As such Hegel presents us with a normative example of recognition.
Each [self-consciousness] is for the other the middle term, through which each mediates itself with itself and unites with itself; and each is for itself and for the other, an immediate being on its own, which at the same time is such only through mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.[9]
Having set up this normative example of mutual recognition, a kind of paradigmatic case of recognition as such; Hegel turns to examine levels of mis-recognition, or the various failures of Desire. Self-consciousness, as a negative structure, cannot come back to itself, that is it cannot realize its freedom, but rather is mediated by the object, or the other of it experience, which is at the same time nothing more than itself duplicated. Only a recognitive structure can successfully allow Desire to satisfy itself, thereby establishing its self-certainty as freedom. As such Hegel undertakes a phenomenological analysis of “the struggle to the death,” which emerges as a result of the initial encounter between two Desiring beings.
“They must engage in this struggle, [struggle to the death] for they must raise their certainty of being for themselves to truth, both in the case of the other and in their own case. And it is only through staking one’s life that freedom is won; only thus is it proved that for self-consciousness, its essential being is not [just] being, not it the immediate form in which it appears, not in its submergence in the expanse of life, but rather that there is nothing present in it which could not be regarded as a vanishing moment, that it is only pure being-for-self. The individual who has not risked his life may well be recognized as a person, but he has not attained to the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness.”[10]
As such, if we are attentive to the quote we see that only through staking one’s Life on the line, that is through the willingness to sacrifice the inner Nature, the immediate unity of being-for-self which maintains itself throughout difference, can freedom be won. It is therefore the case that the struggle to the death does not realize the normative goal of mutual recognition, rather, as a result recognition becomes impossible. As such, this particular structure fails in that it establishes no institution in its wake, there is no properly social moment therefore it does not maintain the three moments of self-consciousness.
The third moment of self-consciousness has been established phenomenologically, or at least its structure has been uncovered.
“For just as life is the natural setting of consciousness, independence without absolute negativity, so death is the natural negation of consciousness, negation without independence, which thus remains without the required significance of recognition.”[11]
As such the lesson it learns is that Life is as essential as self-consciousness itself. We have, as it were, returned to an earlier moment of the Phenomenology. If we turn back toward the earlier shapes, or forms of consciousness we were faced with a natural subject, whose purely negative relation to the object, was such that in order to incorporate the point of view the other must be annihilated. This is what Hegel terms an abstract negation, which retains nothing of the negation, the negated is simply reduced to nothing. This encounter cannot succeed as a matter of course, that is, its Desire cannot be satisfied and recognition cannot be achieved through its completion, rather:
“At first, it will exhibit the side of the inequality of the two, or the splitting up of the middle term into the extremes which, as extremes, are opposed to one another, one being only recognized, the other only recognizing.”[12]
With this diremption, this splitting up, or doubling, of self-consciousness into recognized and recognizing extremes we have allowed for the third moment of self-consciousness, although falling short of the Notion of recognition, as a failure it manages to contribute to the development of Spirit; making the contingency of the previous failures, necessary.
“Lordship and Bondage,” despite being a failure of Desire, that is, despite falling short of the perfect recognitive structure, contributes to the movement of the dialectic in the form of an unequal recognition, which takes place all the same. It should be noted that the movement of history itself is the movement of these failures, or mis-recognitions, which are always brought about by the trace of their possible accomplishment in the present. As such the dialectic lays the ground for the possibility of freedom through the development of a truly social institution. If we remain faithful to the structure, which has guided Hegel throughout, that is the structure of independence and dependence, sameness, or identity, in change, or difference, them we cannot help but notice that the notion of freedom is impossible without the notion of dependence. This is, furthermore, why the struggle to the death did not realize freedom, because no one was left in a position of dependence in order to recognize the freedom of the victor. The dialectic of “Lordship and Bondage” is a truly Spiritual moment of mis-recognition.
In the first place, the movement, which Hegel gives us in “Lordship and Bondage,” is a moment in the development of every self-consciousness, as such it is a properly psychological metaphor which applies to the development of the acting subjects of intersubjectivity. The Lord, or Master, is independent consciousness, absolute identity with itself, in many ways a reversion back to the animal Desire, which characterized the earliest forms of consciousness. As recognized the lord exists as absolute negativity for the Bondsman, or Slave, the lord represents the negation of the bondsman to the bondsman.
“The lord relates himself mediately to the bondman through the being of [a thing] that is independent, for it is just this which holds the bondsman in bondage; it is his chain from which he could not break free in the struggle, thus proving himself to be dependent, to possess his independence in thinghood.[13]
As such the independent aspect of the object is given over to the bondsman, who acts in the view of the Desire of the lord. Therefore, the Desire of the lord can be satisfied, as he has mediated his Desire through The bondsman. The lord, as independent consciousness, is however, static, there is no mobility in the lord’s position, rather, the status of the lord depends upon the bondsman whom he does not recognize.
The bondsman, having failed to give up his chain, or having failed to place his life on the line, becomes dependent consciousness and can only recognize the lord. The lord is absolute negation, or the fear of death, as an object for the bondsman. In true psychological jargon the lord embodies both the ego-ideal and the super-ego; that is to say that the lord, is both an independent consciousness that the bondsman can strive to become and that which causes the bondsman to repress its own Desire in the form of work. The bondsman, without being able to negate the object for its own enjoyment, works on the object for the lord’s enjoyment. “Work, on the other hand, is desire held in check…”[14] the bondsman has learned to rationalize his individual desire and replace it with the Desire of the lord. As such, the bondsman has overcome the chain, which bound it to the lord, that is through work, which takes place upon the threat of death; the bondsman has managed to overcome his animal desire for a Spiritual desire. It therefore, becomes apparent that through its work the bondsman is able to overcome the chains which bind him and now, having an actual context of freedom and repression can strive to accomplish the task of freedom.
We have demonstrated how it is that “Lordship and Bondage” manages to substitute Spirit for Nature. Or, how the slavish, or bonded, consciousness is able to overcome its purely natural Desire for a Spiritual one. The movement, also establishes an unequal social institution between acting agents in the world, one which enables the development of further historical movement, as such, it is also a material historical structure, which actually existed. It becomes apparent, when viewed in this way, that what is true for the individual is also true for the historical development of the totality. Although Slavery, might be lamentable, and regrettable. In hindsight, perhaps viewed from our historical situatedness as an institution, perhaps the first institution, it was necessary in order that we might come to understand that we could transform our natural limits through work. Furthermore, it necessitates the development of an objective sphere between the lord and the bondman, wherein the Desire of the lord can be articulated and understood by the bondsman.
Have we come to a better understanding of the Hegelian notion of freedom and the departure undertaken in the chapter on self-consciousness? This work became far more expository and exegetical than was initially anticipated; perhaps the trajectory itself was a necessary one. The movement seems necessary, that is in order to truly grasp what has transpired in Hegel one must actually go through the movements oneself. That being said, I have attempted to offer a reading, an attempt to make sense of the work, which in turn has contributed a great deal to my own understanding. For that I am grateful, and if nothing else about this paper is true it has at least been a valuable journey.
[1] G.W.F Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans A.V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977. § 177.
[2] Ibid., § 196.
[3] Ibid., § 177.
[4] Ibid., § 177.
[5] “They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.” Ibid., § 184.
[6] Ibid., § 176.
[7] Ibid., § 174.
[8] Alexandre Kojève. Introduction To The Reading Of Hegel: Lectures On The Phenomenology of Spirit. Ed. Allan Bloom, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. New York: Basic Books, 1969. p. 4.
[9] Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. § 184.
[10] Ibid., §. 187.
[11] Ibid., §. 188.
[12] Ibid., §. 185.
[13] Ibid., §. 190.
[14]Ibid., §. 195.
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